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Abstract. Machine learning models are increasingly used in the indus-
try to make decisions such as credit insurance approval. Some people
may be tempted to manipulate specific variables, such as the age or the
salary, in order to get better chances of approval. In this ongoing work,
we propose to discuss, with a first proposition, the issue of detecting a
potential local adversarial example on classical tabular data by providing
to a human expert the locally critical features for the classifier’s decision,
in order to control the provided information and avoid a fraud.
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1 Introduction
As machine learning models are increasingly being used to make decisions that
directly impact people, the risk of fraudulent attempts to fool these models is
more present than ever. Let us consider the case of an insurance company with an
automated service that allows customers to apply for credit insurance. Through
a dedicated interface, clients have to provide personal details so a machine learn-
ing prediction model can assess their risks of default and decide automatically
whether they are eligible for the insurance. A potential customer may want to
improve his chances of getting the credit insurance and could be tempted to
game the system by fooling the decision model. The malicious customer could
lie to some of the questions he is being asked, such as his salary or age. These
alterations will affect the input provided to the automatic classifier and may
change the prediction. Such attacks could provoke major issues for an insurance
company: an inaccurate risk assessment can lead to a possibility of bankruptcy.
Then, how is it possible to prevent these attacks, and more precisely, what de-
fense strategy should be applied against these attacks?
In this paper, we address the following issue: given an automated classifier
and a potential customer, our objective is to identify a sparse set of features that
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are the most important for the classifier’s prediction made for this customer and
thus the ones that could easily alter the prediction. Given these most impor-
tant features, it is possible to ask the potential client for additional informa-
tion or proof, in order to counter a potential adversarial attack by ascertaining
the truthfulness of his declarations. The proposed approach is framed at the
intersection of adversarial machine learning and human-interpretable machine
learning. Given a point in a feature space (ie. a potential client) we propose to
search the closest decision boundaries of the classifier, which we assume to be
the most relevant for the point’s prediction, and fit an interpretable surrogate
model to approximate these boundaries. The most important features for this
prediction are then extracted from the surrogate. These features lead to checks
in order to prevent a potential adversarial attack. This defense approach is local
(ie centered around the prediction to assess), focused on classical feature-based
classification problems and model-agnostic (i.e. independent to the choice of the
black-box classifier), since we assume that no information about the classifier is
made available for the proposed approach.
The next section details the relevant background for this work. Section 3
presents a formalization of the considered problem and a description of the prin-
ciples of our proposition. Section 4 proposes a first evaluation of our proposition
on the German Credit dataset: we quantify the fidelity to the classifier and we
provide an example of explanation that can be used as a defense against an attack
by clarifying whether an input is an adversarial example or not. We conclude
this paper by outlining the perspectives to pursue this work.
2 Background
In adversarial machine learning, evasion attacks [3,6,11] aim at generating ad-
versarial examples that fool a machine learning classifier. Defense techniques
have been developed to counter these attacks: either by changing the training
process of the classifier to be attacked to make it more robust to small perturba-
tions [10,2] or by adding a detection mechanism to identify potential adversarial
examples [4]. However, both strategies generally rely on strong assumptions or
knowledge, either about the dataset or about our capacity to identify the true
label of an instance. For instance, when dealing with images, a human is able
to provide at test time the true label despite an adversarial perturbation. In the
mentioned insurance context, the classifier’s output for a potential adversarial
example can’t be compared with the true label since it is unknown (eg. a default
would happen in the future). To mitigate this issue, we look into the classifier’s
inner working to assess the potential weaknesses of a client’s application, and
control the veracity of problematic information he may have provided.
To do so, the field of machine learning interpretability aims at generating
explanations to provide insights about a prediction made by a black-box classi-
fier. Explanations can take the form of feature importance vectors that quantify
the relative impact of each feature in the prediction [1,12,9]. To extract these
feature importances, we focus on surrogate model approaches which attempt to
approximate the decision boundary of a black-box classifier with a simpler inter-
pretable model either at global scale (to mimic the global behavior of a black-box
model) [5,7] or at local scale (to mimic the black-box behavior locally, around
a prediction for instance) [12,8]. Surrogate model approaches can somewhat be
related to the task of model theft in adversarial learning, which consists in build-
ing a substitute model to copycat the decisions of a black-box classifier, either to
steal it and use its outputs [13] or to use it for transferable evasion attacks [10].
3 Proposition: Local Adversarial Detection (LAD)
The following context is considered: a black-box classifier b : X → Y is trained on
a dataset composed of an input feature space X = RD made of classical features
and an output Y where each instance x ∈ X is associated with a class label y ∈ Y.
The classifier b is publicly available for querying and accepts an input vector
x (e.g. containing information such as age and income) to provide predictions
b(x) that lead to business decisions (such as insurance or credit acceptance).
For security reasons, each input x leading to a prediction b(x) is considered
suspicious: it is considered as being a potential adversarial example xˆ (i.e. fake
information), generated to get a more favourable decision from the black-box
classifier b such that b(x) 6= b(xˆ). In the context of insurance, it is assumed
that the provided input data is reasonable since it deals with real or physical
variables.
In this work, our objective is to design a security layer to provide an adaptive
defense that returns the most important features to check in order to clarify
whether or not an input xˆ should be investigated. Given a prediction b(xˆ) and
a potential adversarial example xˆ to assess, we aim at providing the locally
most important features for the black-box classifier that lead to the prediction
b(xˆ). These features are also the most sensitive for someone willing to fool the
classifier b, and can be investigated by a human expert or a machine to ask for a
relevant set of proofs to avoid a fraud. For instance, given xˆ, if the income is the
only important feature that would significantly impacts the prediction b(xˆ), then
a single proof of income would be necessary to counter an adversarial attack.
Our objective is thus to identify a set Fxˆ of features from X that are key for
the prediction b(xˆ) and should be checked to clarify whether xˆ is a malicious
customer or not.
To solve that problem, we propose to fit a local surrogate in order to approxi-
mate the closest local black-box boundaries to the potential adversarial example
xˆ. Then, the set Fxˆ of features that are key for the prediction b(xˆ) is extracted
from the local surrogate. The proposed Algorithm 1 and its different steps il-
lustrated Figure 1 work as follows. To detect the closest decision boundaries,
N support points xisp are drawn in X with b(xsp) 6= b(xˆ) (Figure 1b). These
support points delimit segments [xˆ;xisp] ∀i ∈ [1;N ] on which the local black-box
boundary should be sought: to do so, the maximum of the information gain is
sought on every segment [xˆ;xisp] based on M points drawn on these segments
then labeled using b (Figures 1c and 1d). The point on each segment where the
(a) Potential adversar-
ial example xˆ (red dot)
over black-box classifier’s
boundaries
(b) Random generation of
support points xsp where
b(xsp) 6= b(xˆ)
(c) Random generation
and classification of points
on segments [xˆ;xsp]
(d) Boundary search: seg-
ment points that maximize
the information gain
(e) Generation and classifi-
cation of points around the
boundary touchpoints
(f) Boundaries of the
trained interpretable
surrogate
Fig. 1: Principle of Local Adverse Detection (LAD)
information gain is maximal is called a boundary touchpoint xbt. These points
are on the black-box boundary or close to it: it is possible to outline locally the
black-box boundary shape. Then, an interpretable local surrogate classifier sxˆ
is trained on a small set of points generated in the immediate neighbourhood
of the local black-box boundary (Figures 1e and 1f), outlined by the boundary
touchpoints xbt. Finally, the set of key features Fxˆ for the prediction b(xˆ) is
extracted from the surrogate sxˆ that approximates the local boundary of the
classifier b.
4 Case Study: German Credit Dataset
We present a first use case towards designing a complete and robust experi-
mental protocol to evaluate the quality of the proposed approach. This work is
still in progress and requires further discussion.
We apply the proposed approach to the German Credit dataset available from
UCI. A classifier b (a Random Forest with 200 estimators) is trained on 70% of
the data and acts as the automated decision model accepting or rejecting the
customer’s application. Considering information provided by customers xˆ from
the remaining test dataset (250 instances), the LAD algorithm is used (with
N = 1000, M = 100 and the surrogate being a decision tree with a maximum
tree depth of 5) to extract the key features for prediction b(xˆ). They constitute
the features an expert should check to ascertain the prediction.
Algorithm 1 Outline of Local Adverse Detection (LAD) algorithm
Input: potential adversarial example xˆ ∈ X , classifier b : X → Y, untrained surro-
gate sx, N , M
xsp ← Draw N support points xisp ∈ X , i ∈ [1...N ] with b(xisp) 6= b(xˆ)
for all xisp ∈ xsp do
xiseg ← Draw M segment points xi,jseg, j ∈ [1...M ] with xi,jseg ∈ [xˆ;xiseg]
yiseg ← b(xiseg) label every segment points with the classifier b
xibt ← Find the touchpoint xibt ∈ [xˆ;xiseg] that maximizes the info gain IG(yiseg)
Xsix ← Draw P points in an hypersphere of radius rsx around the touchpoint x
i
bt
Ysix ← Label every points Xsix with the classifier b
end for
Ysx ← b(Xsx)
Train the local surrogate sx on (Xsx , Ysx)
Fxˆ ← Extract the most important features from sx
Return: Fxˆ
Our first experiment assesses the accurate approximation of the black-box
classifier’s local decision boundary by the local surrogate trained with LAD. The
Local Fidelity metric described in [8] is used to assess locally, around the potential
adversarial example, the fidelity of the surrogate sxˆ to the classifier b. The Local
Fidelity metric is defined as the fidelity of the local surrogate sxˆ to the black-box
classifier b within a neighborhood Vxˆ around xˆ. |Vx| points are therefore drawn
uniformly in the neighbourhood Vxˆ of xˆ bounded by an hypersphere of radius r.
Then, to get the local fidelity of sxˆ to b, the classification accuracy is computed
on these points labeled with both sxˆ and b, such as:
LocalF id(xˆ, sxˆ) = Accxi∈Vxˆ(b(xi), sxˆ(xi)) (1)
We set |Vx| = 1000 and the radius of the hyperspheres as a percentage
(between 0.05% and 0.5%) of the maximum distance between xˆ and the test
dataset. To challenge the proposed approach, we choose to use the substitute
model method from [10], based on data generated using Jacobian augmentation.
The average local fidelity values over all the test dataset are shown Figure 2.
As mentioned earlier, an important difference of [10] compared to the proposed
approach lies in the fact that the trained substitute is global instead of focusing
on a specific region. Then, as shown Figure 2, the average local fidelity of LAD
is higher for smaller radius values as expected. However, as the radius increases
and the evaluation of the fidelity of the substitutes is performed on a wider scale,
the difference vanishes.
An important contribution of this proposition consists in the generation of
explanations given a prediction for a potential adversarial example. A very first
illustration is provided in Table 1. We consider a customer application to a credit
described by vector xˆ, generated from x, the true unknown customer application:
only the feature ”Age in years” has been manipulated, from 47 to 46 in order to
allow the applicant to get accepted for the credit by the automated classifier. In
order to detect the fraud, the LAD algorithm has been used to generate a list of
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Fig. 2: Local Fidelity for LAD and Papernot2017 [10] on German Credit dataset
for several values of r
Table 1: LAD’s feature importance for an adversarial example generated on
German Credit given a classifier b. LAD is able to identify the importance of
Age in years for the classification
Features Credit amount Credit history Age in years Housing Foreign worker ...
Importance 0.43 0.28 0.10 0.09 0.07 ...
features that are locally important for the black-box model b, which could have
been used to manipulate the outcome of b. As expected, the age feature has a
high feature importance and is the first one a client could easily manipulate. LAD
would tell a human expert to check in priority this feature for this illustrative
example.
5 Conclusion and Perspectives
This paper proposes to discuss a use-case for adversarial defense. It consists in
the detection of local adversarial examples for feature-based automated deci-
sion problems. Credit insurance provides an example where some people may
be tempted to manipulate information they have to provide to increase their
chances to get accepted. While this paper describes a preliminary work, we pro-
posed a method to detect potential adversarial examples by identifying features
that have the most impact locally, over the prediction made by a black-box clas-
sifier. This method trains an interpretable surrogate to approximate the local
decision boundary of the black-box classifier and extract feature importances.
These features are provided to a human expert in charge of checking the corre-
sponding information to ascertain the prediction. A first application on German
Credit is used to illustrate our approach: the local fidelity of the method to the
classifier it approximates is assessed and the important features to check are
extracted for a generated adversarial example.
Our on-going work aims first at consolidating the proposed use-case and
formalization of the problem. We plan to improve and test in-depth our propo-
sition (LAD) with a robust experimental protocol, in particular with adversarial
examples generated by evasion attack methods to quantify to what extent the
approach can help to detect adversarial examples in such context.
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